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ABSTRACT. This paper examines the role of the financial sector in renewable energy
(RE) development. Although RE can bring socio-economic and environmental benefits,
its implementation faces a number of obstacles, especially in non-OECD countries. One
of these obstacles is financing: underdeveloped financial sectors are unable to efficiently
channel loans to RE producers. The influence of financial sector development on the
use of renewable energy resources is confirmed in panel data estimations on up to 119
non-OECD countries for 1980–2006. Financial intermediation, in particular commercial
banking, has a significant positive effect on the amount of RE produced, and the impact is
especially large when we consider non-hydropower RE such as wind, solar, geothermal
and biomass. There is also evidence that the development of the RE sector has picked up
significantly in the period since the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol.
1. Introduction
Achieving a diversified and sustainable energy supply for future
generations is one of the major challenges for today’s policymakers. Global
energy demand is projected to grow by around 45 per cent by 2030: more
than three-quarters of the increased demand will come from developing
and transition countries (IEA, 2008). Energy demand will continue to be
covered mainly by conventional fossil fuels, such as coal, oil and natural gas;
accordingly, energy-related pollution is predicted to increase by up to 45 per
cent. Although Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries will still be major polluters, 97 per cent of the estimated
increase will come from non-OECD countries, especially China, India and
the Middle East (IEA, 2008). Meanwhile, many estimates predict that oil
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and possibly natural gas production will plateau around the same time,
casting doubt on future energy security.1 Hence, achieving a sustainable
energy supply requires diversifying energy sources and changing the
current dependence on non-renewable and polluting hydrocarbon fuels.
For example, in a recent report the UN Commission on Sustainable
Development states:
‘Energy is crucial for sustainable development, poverty eradication and
achieving the internationally agreed development goals, including the
Millennium Development Goals. [. . .] Access to reliable, affordable,
economically viable, socially acceptable and environmentally sound energy
services is crucial, particularly in developing countries. [. . .] While fossil fuels
will continue to play an important role in the energy supply in the decades to
come, every effort must be made to diversify the energy mix’ (UN, 2007: 15).
Renewable energy technologies (RETs) can bring about both
environmental and socio-economic benefits.2 They generally entail fewer
emissions, use local resources – including labour – foster basic electrification
in developing countries and increase energy security.3 However, although
there are already several commercially available and economically
attractive RETs, they still account for only a modest proportion of global
energy generation. This fact suggests that there are some missing links
between the potential of RETs and their implementation. One problem
regards the institutional framework and the absence of a policy design
to effectively foster RETs. In this paper, we focus on another important
missing link: the financing of renewable energy (RE) projects, in particular
the relationship between financial sector and RET development in transition
and developing countries.This missing link has been pointed out by
numerous practitioners, who see the absence of well-developed financial
intermediaries and the consequent financing difficulties as one of the most
important obstacles during the realization of RE projects in developing
countries (e.g., Painuly and Wohlgemuth, 2006).
1 The US Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2000) alone has published
several different scenarios, with global oil production peaking between 2021
and 2112. The International Energy Agency (IEA) now expects conventional oil
production to plateau before 2030 (Economist, 2009). Note, however, that there is
also some skepticism regarding the peak oil scenarios. For a discussion of peak
oil, see, for example, Deffeyes (2005).
2 RETs include both the more traditional hydropower technologies, as well as
newer technologies that harness wind, solar, biomass and geothermal power.
Most recently, the use of biofuels and their negative impact on food production,
for example in Brazil, has called into question the wisdom of promoting (all types
of) RETs. In our investigation, we concentrate on electricity generation, where
wood and waste are the only types of biomass considered and biofuels therefore
play no role.
3 Barbier (2009) presents a more extensive discussion of the short- to long-term
environmental, social and economic benefits of RETs not only for developed, but
also for developing countries. One of the effects mentioned is a positive local
employment effect: for example, in China the RE sector already offers nearly
1 million jobs, while in India, the wind energy sector alone employs around
10 thousand people (see also Renner et al., 2008).
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Energy projects generally demand high levels of financing, which
producers in less developed economies in particular can rarely cover on
their own (World Bank, 1999; IEA, 2003). In turn, the financing for RETs
is closely connected to the development of the financial sector. On the
one hand, energy sector privatisation and liberalisation during the course
of the 1990s increased the contribution of smaller private power projects,
and at the same time induced a shift in external financing from the local
government and multilateral institutions to private investors (Babbar and
Schuster, 1998; Tharakan et al., 2007; Tirpak and Adams, 2008). On the other
hand, RE projects have very high start-up costs relative to the expected
monetary returns, and lengthy payback periods: they therefore typically
require long-term maturity loans (UNEP FI, 2004; Sonntag-O’Brien and
Usher, 2004b). The result was a plunge in energy project investment in
the mid 1990s as large bilateral and multilateral donors pulled out, and
investment in this sector has struggled to take off again.
The problem of financing RE projects is twofold: firstly, RET firms
generally need long-term loans, whose availability in turn is positively
linked to the development of the banking system (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and
Maksimovic, 1999). In less developed economies, the banking sector is
the major source of external financing (Tadesse, 2002; Carlin and Mayer,
2003; Beck et al., 2004b), and access to bank credit is a serious problem
especially for small- and medium-sized companies (Beck et al., 2004a). As
a consequence, RE projects in less developed countries are at a particular
disadvantage. Secondly, RET firms have limited access to financing because
RE projects compete against fossil fuel projects, which have a longer
track record, relatively lower up-front costs, shorter lead times, and often
favourable political treatment (Churchill and Saunders, 1989; Head, 2000;
World Bank, 2002; Sonntag-O’Brien and Usher, 2004b).
It is worth noting that in both cases, underinvestment in RET firms can be
interpreted in terms of imperfect information between firms and financiers:
projects aimed at developing new technologies bear, almost by definition,
greater information costs to investors, which are more easily borne by a
highly developed financial sector. Where the latter is not given, the result
may well be a market distortion in favour of less risky investments, such
as fossil fuel projects and large-sized enterprises. This is consistent with
the view that the development of the domestic financial sector is a crucial
factor in meeting the booming energy demand in less developed economies
(Ishiguro and Akiyama, 1995; World Bank, 2003).
RE adoption is one of the targets of the Kyoto Protocol. There are
two mechanisms in particular which can potentially help to overcome
the financing hurdle, namely the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
and the Joint Implementation (JI) programme. Both are designed to help
Kyoto Protocol member countries – in particular Annex B countries –
meet their emission targets, and to encourage the private sector to
contribute to emission reduction efforts (see e.g., Pacudan, 2005). The CDM
mechanism, in particular, has been quite popular since its inception in
2006, with more than 1,000 projects already approved. It is the only Kyoto
Protocol mechanism that includes developing countries: it allows Annex
B countries that are subject to emission-reduction targets to implement
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emission-reduction projects in non-Annex B developing countries, and
earn certified emission reduction credits (JI programmes on the other hand
involve joint projects by two Annex B countries). Some RE projects were
already initiated in the late 1990s as CDM or JI pilot programmes, such
as the Tejona wind farm in Costa Rica.4 The Kyoto Protocol’s adoption in
December 1997 obviously marks a major change in global climate policy: we
incorporate the potential ‘Kyoto effects’ into our study to further isolate the
impact of financial sector development on the RE sector. However, it is still
too early to gauge the full impact of the new Kyoto financing possibilities
on the adoption of RE in developing and transition countries; this question
is therefore left to future research.5
The analysis of the role of the financial sector – commercial banking,
financial markets, insurance, etc. – for economic performance has generated
a vast literature during the past two decades (see e.g., Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and
Levine, 2001 for an overview). The importance of the (private) financial
sector particularly for the development of the energy sector has also been
pointed out in several studies. In one of the earliest analyses of energy
sector financing in developing countries, Churchill and Saunders (1989)
discuss a proper policy framework to encourage private sector financial
involvement. Ten years later, Babbar and Schuster (1998) and Head (2000)
still find substantial gaps in the financing of power projects, particularly RE
projects. The financing obstacles for RETs are confirmed in the overview by
Wohlgemuth and Painuly (1999), where efforts in different countries and
regions are discussed and several policy recommendations derived. More
recently, Sonntag-O’Brien and Usher (2004a) and Painuly and Wohlgemuth
(2006) take a look at the experience to date with RET implementation in
developing and transition countries, and again point to the (private sector)
financing problems that RE projects encounter, as well as to some successful
models that have been adopted. MacLean and Siegel (2007) concentrate on
the financing of small-scale RE projects and distinguish three financing
areas: end-user finance, business finance and small-scale project finance.
The need for well-informed (local) commercial financiers, often to act as
4 The Tejona wind farm also illustrates the importance of an adequate financing
framework. The project’s history dates back to the 1970s, when the Costa Rican
government applied to the regional Development Bank and the World Bank for
financing assistance. A feasibility study followed in 1993, and a private wind
energy company sought to develop the wind farm as an independent power
project. However, it took until 1998 to find a project financing model, which ended
up being a build-operate-lease construction together with a Dutch consortium,
with the support of the Dutch government and the coordination of the Global
Environment Facility. In the meantime, the Costa Rican Electricity Institute had
decided to develop the site as a public sector project. The wind farm is now
operational and has a capacity of 20 MW. Several private wind farm developers
are negotiating project finance arrangements for new wind power developments
under power purchase agreements with the Electricity Institute (see van Hulle
et al., 2003).
5 See, for example, Huang and Barker (2009) for a study on the effects to date of the
CDM mechanism on CO2 emissions.
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financing partners for the government and/or international development
organizations, is a recurrent theme in all three areas.6
Despite the importance of the financial sector for the development of RETs
particularly in developing and transition countries, which is borne out by
numerous case studies and anecdotal evidence, the subject has received
little academic research attention. This paper contributes to the knowledge
on what determines RET implementation by empirically analysing the
relationship between financial intermediation and RE sector development,
with a focus on non-OECD countries. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first attempt to examine this issue in a systematic empirical analysis.7
The literature discussed above suggests that a more highly developed
financial sector will have a positive impact on the development of the
RE sector. A well-functioning and unrestricted banking sector should be
particularly relevant for credit allocation to RE companies in developing
and transition countries, where financial markets are still relatively small
and bond or equity financing is therefore difficult or impossible. Of course,
a well-developed financial sector alone is no guarantee for the success of
RETs: the availability of adequate financing mechanisms should be viewed
in the wider context of an appropriate RE policy framework.8
We propose an empirical framework to test the effect of financial sector
development on RETs. We construct a panel dataset for up to 119 non-OECD
countries for the period 1980–2006, using electricity generation per capita
6 Among the examples cited in the report is that of a small hydro project on the West
Nile in Uganda. The project was realized thanks to a loan from a commercial lender,
Barclays, which has a strong presence in Africa. ‘Given their lack of experience
with this type of project and other financial market conditions’, Barclays was
however only willing to extend a seven-year loan (MacLean and Siegel, 2007:
71). In order to make the project affordable, the World Bank provided a partial
guarantee, which extended the loan term to 14 years. Note that since that initial
experience, Barclays has financed similar projects in Africa, including another
small hydro plant in Kenya, and – together with a South African bank – a 250 MW
hydro-electric station, again on the Nile river in Uganda.
7 The theoretical contributions on this topic are equally scarce: one attempt to
model the connections between finance and RE sector development is presented
in Brunnschweiler (2006).
8 Missing finance is obviously connected to the more general policy framework
for RETs: as previous literature has pointed out, limited financing of RETs
derives not only from underdeveloped financial intermediators, but also from
the lack of a specific policy design, and/or crowding-out effects from government
policies favouring investment in fossil fuel projects (Churchill and Saunders, 1989;
Wohlgemuth and Painuly, 1999; Head, 2000; World Bank, 2002; Sonntag-O’Brien
and Usher, 2004b; UNEP FI, 2004). Institutional shortcomings also contribute to the
often limited consideration by potential investors of the positive environmental
externalities of RETs in project development costs. In general, the perception
that energy sustainability is not a top priority for policymakers further lowers
investors’ willingness to finance projects where the foreseeable rewards are already
relatively low and long in the coming (see Williams and Ghanadan, 2006 for a
useful survey of electricity reform policies in developing and transition countries).
We take the policy framework into account in our estimations to isolate the specific
effect of financial sector development (see section 2).
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from RE technologies as a proxy for RE sector development. We isolate the
financial sector effects by controlling for energy-relevant policy measures,
as well as measures of more general institutional quality. The empirical
results from generalised least squares (GLS) and dynamic Arellano–Bond
Generalised Method-of-Moments (GMM) panel estimations confirm the
positive effect of financial sector and especially commercial banking sector
development on RET use in developing and transition countries. The effects
are particularly strong and economically significant for the newer RETs,
including wind, solar, geothermal and biomass, while the overall impact
on RE and hydropower generation is much more limited in magnitude,
though still statistically significant.
The results also suggest that the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol has had
a strong positive effect on the diffusion of RETs throughout developing
and transition countries. The findings are robust to the inclusion of other
covariates which could influence RE sector development, such as oil,
coal and natural gas production and prices and proxies for RE potential.
The implication is that without proper (private sector) finance, RE is
unlikely to reach its full potential in the developing world. An adequate
financing framework should therefore be part of a more general RE sector
development policy.
The paper is organised as follows. The data and empirical methodology
are described in section 2, while the results are presented in section 3. Section
4 concludes with a brief summary and discussion.
2. Data and methodology
The discussion of the role of commercial finance in the development of
RE has so far been based mainly on case studies and anecdotal evidence.
The lack of a more systematic empirical analysis of the correlation between
financial sector and RE development, independent of (or complementary
to) a specific RE policy framework, has probably also been due to the data
problem regarding the quantification of the RE sector, especially in the
developing world.
The obstacles begin with the definition of RE in official statistics:
traditionally, hydropower – mostly provided by large plants – has delivered
the lion’s share of RE in countries’ energy generation mix, with other
types of RE – when included – making up barely a few per cent of
overall energy production. Recently, however, some environmentalists and
policymakers have contended that large hydropower projects should not
be viewed as viable contributions to sustainable energy production, as
they often cause serious negative environmental and social externalities
(notable examples are the giant Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River
in China or the Ilisu dam project in Turkey). Moreover, most traditional,
large hydro projects in the developing world have been co-financed by
multilateral financial institutions and the local governments, with little or
no involvement sought of commercial finance (World Bank, 2003). The
use of an overall RE measure could therefore introduce a downward
bias into the results on the importance of the financial sector for more
modern RETs such as wind, geothermal and solar power. A further possible
issue concerns the negative impact on agricultural (food) production of
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Shown for non-OECD countries from 1980 to 2006
Variable Observation Mean
Standard
deviation Minimum Maximum
repc 3911 0.31 0.78 0.00 10.03
hydropc 3911 0.30 0.78 0.00 10.03
geopc 3911 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.34
dbacba 3321 0.74 0.23 −0.11 1.34
pcrdbgdp 2901 0.27 0.23 0.00 1.66
llgdp 2914 0.41 0.27 0.00 1.57
psreform 3564 2.58 2.37 0.00 6.00
econfree 2446 5.5 1.1 2.1 8.79
gdppc 3566 4946.10 7064.55 111.76 70715.84
fdigdp 3380 3.30 9.22 −82.89 348.19
oilprodpc 3967 0.04 0.17 0.00 2.11
oilprice 4212 24.27 11.31 12.21 61.50
hydropot 3022 93.25 262.13 0 2474
windpot 4212 0.13 0.34 0 1
encouraging biomass production for use as biofuel, as demonstrated by the
recent large fluctuations in the prices of grains and other foodstuffs.
We consider these issues when testing the importance of financial
intermediation for RET development. First, we distinguish between
different types of RE generation, in addition to the aggregate measure.
Second, as a proxy for our dependent variable, RE sector development, we
use electricity generated with renewable resources in per-capita terms, and
therefore avoid the issue of biofuels.
We construct three separate measures of RE sector development. The
first, repc, measures the overall renewable resource electricity generation –
including all types of hydropower, wood and waste, geothermal, solar and
wind – in billion kwh per capita. The second variable, hydropc, considers
only hydroelectric power generation, again in billion kwh per capita.
This distinction takes into account the importance of large hydropower
in electricity generation, and their possible distorting effect on the results
found using the data on total RE generation. The third and final dependent
variable, geopc, considers electricity produced from all non-hydro RE types
including some of the latest RETs, i.e., geothermal, solar, wind and wood
and waste energy resources. Again, this measure is in billion kwh per capita.
The electricity generation data for all three dependent variables is freely
available from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) on a yearly
basis since 1980 (or since the early 1990s for countries of the former Soviet
Union and former Yugoslavia). The EIA notes that the sum of components
in the data may not equal the total listed due to independent rounding.
Detailed descriptions of all variables and their sources can be found in
the appendix. The descriptive statistics in table 1 show that the dependent
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variables repc and hydropc have a wide variation in per capita RE resource
intensity, while the generation of non-hydro renewable resource electricity
(geopc) is more limited.
A look at the share of RE in overall electricity generation shows that on
average, in non-OECD countries around 34 per cent of electric power was
produced by RE resources between 1980 and 2006, compared with around 32
per cent in OECD countries. This relatively similar picture remains when we
consider the share of hydroelectric power generation in overall electricity
generation, which was on average around 33 per cent for non-OECD and
29 per cent for OECD countries. In both groups of countries, hydropower
covered from 0 per cent right up to 100 per cent of total electricity generation.
The situation is more varied when we look at the non-hydro RE share: in
non-OECD countries, wood, waste, wind, solar and geothermal energy
produced barely 1 per cent of total electricity on average, but up to 40 per
cent in low- to middle-income countries like El Salvador and Nicaragua. In
OECD countries, the average share of electricity generated from non-hydro
RE was three per cent, reaching up to nearly 20 per cent in Luxembourg
and 30 per cent in Denmark.9
As noted above, the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in late 1997 marks
a huge shift in global climate policy, which also affects RE policy. It is
therefore interesting to examine the data for any prima facie evidence of a
change in RE use since 1998. In general, there has indeed been an increase
in electricity generation with RETs in non-OECD countries: overall RE
electricity generation went from an average of 263.4 million kwh per capita
before Kyoto to 393.8 million kwh per capita post-Kyoto. This was due to
a large increase in hydropower, but also to a near doubling of non-hydro
electricity production from an average 5 million kwh per capita to 9.6 million
kwh per capita. Further analysis reveals that the post-Kyoto increase in RE
use is common for all country income groups. It is also observable in all
regions of the world, with a particularly large jump in RE use in South-
Eastern Asia: here, average overall RE electricity generation went from
295.8 billion kwh per capita to 507.8 billion kwh per capita post-Kyoto.
Again, most of the increase in this region comes from more hydropower;
but non-hydro electricity generation increased more than 27-fold from a
comparatively very modest 21 thousand kwh per capita to an average 569.4
thousand kwh per capita in the period after 1998. These initial findings are
suggestive of a strong ‘Kyoto effect’, which we will test for in the estimations
below.
9 In our estimations, we use the per-capita values of RE and not the share
of RE in total energy production. This avoids picking up possible spurious
correlations between financial sector development and the RE share, since total
energy generation (in the denominator) is probably highly correlated with overall
economic development (including financial sector development). To further
preclude spurious results, we control for income per capita (see below). However,
the main results – in particular for the share of non-hydro RE used in power
generation – are qualitatively similar using RE shares to those found using RE per
capita (available upon request).
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The main explanatory variables include three different indicators of
financial sector development, and a vector of control variables. The
measures of financial sector development are taken from Beck et al. (2000).
They are not direct measures of banks’ efficiency in credit allocation, but
rather different proxies for financial intermediary development tested in
the literature.10 The first indicator of financial sector development, dbacba,
measures the importance of commercial banks’ asset share versus that
of the central bank. In more highly developed and open economies, the
commercial financial sector handles a greater share of household savings
than the central bank. Assuming that the commercial financial sector is more
efficient than the public one in allocating credits, dbacba should positively
correlate with RET development. This variable has also been tested several
times in the finance literature, e.g., in King and Levine (1993a,b) and Levine
et al. (2000).
The second variable, pcrdbgdp, captures the amount of credit provided
by financial institutions to the private sector as a share of gross domestic
product (GDP). It excludes credits issued by governments and development
banks. An unrestricted financial sector can be expected to account for
a larger share of lending to the private sector. In fact, this variable has
been shown by Levine et al. (2000) to be a reliable measure of financial
intermediary development, i.e., the ability of financial institutions to
efficiently mobilise and allocate resources to profitable ventures. Earlier
versions of the measure were used for example in King and Levine (1993a,b)
and Levine and Zervos (1998). We expect pcrdbgdp to correlate positively
with the level of development of the RE sector.
The third and final financial variable, llgdp, is a general measure of
financial sector development commonly known as ‘financial depth’. It is
defined as liquid liabilities of the financial system – currency plus demand
and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and other financial intermediaries
or, more generally, M2 – divided by GDP. Financial depth is the broadest
measure of financial intermediation, giving an indication of the overall size
of the financial sector without distinguishing either between commercial
and non-commercial banks and other financial intermediaries, or between
the use of the liabilities. The assumption is that the relative size of the
financial intermediary sector is positively correlated with the quantity and
quality of the financial services provided, and we would therefore again
expect a positive influence on the development of RETs.
All three financial variables are measured in current prices, and GDP
is purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted (see Beck et al., 2000 for more
10 Beck et al. (2000) provide a large financial structure dataset on the World Bank
website. The data used here comes from the dataset revised on November 21,
2008. This also includes two new variables which measure the efficiency with
which commercial banks channel funds from savers to investors: overhead costs
(i.e., the accounting value of a bank’s overhead costs as share of its total assets) and
the net interest margin (i.e., the accounting value of a bank’s net interest revenue
as a share of its total assets). Unfortunately however, these measures are as yet
only available since the mid 1990s for a limited number of countries. We therefore
use three more conventional measures of financial sector development.
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details). Table 1 shows that there is considerable variation in the financial
sector development in non-OECD countries, ranging from practically
non-existent in some countries to levels comparable with many OECD
countries.11 As is to be expected, the means of all three indices were higher
throughout the period for upper-middle-income and high-income non-
OECD countries: the average values of dbacba, pcrdbgdp and llgdp were,
respectively, 0.86, 0.39 and 0.53, as opposed to 0.67, 0.19 and 0.33 in low-
and lower-middle-income countries. These numbers also seem to indicate
that the three variables measure slightly different aspects of the financial
sector: in fact, dbacba has a 0.5 correlation with pcrdbgdp and 0.39 with
llgdp, while pcrdbgdp and llgdp are more highly correlated (0.8). We will use
the three financial sector variables separately to minimise multicollinearity
issues.
We expect RE sector development to depend on several factors other than
financial intermediation. One obvious factor is the regulatory (or policy)
framework for RE. We introduce two variables to capture different aspects
of energy sector regulation. The first, psreform, describes the level of power
sector reform, without special reference to RETs. It is based on a broad
qualitative survey by the World Bank conducted in 1998 (ESMAP, 1999) and
takes on values from 0 (least reformed) to 6 (reforms in all relevant areas
have been implemented). The evaluation considers measures to create equal
market opportunities for all energy resource types and encourage private
firms’ participation and competition (‘competition’ being a main reform
criterion). Hence, psreform is a proxy for government energy policies –
although unfortunately a time-invariant proxy, since it is based on a one-
time study. The ESMAP study was conducted for a large number of
developing and transition economies, but not for most high-income and
OECD countries. We assigned a value of 6 to all high-income non-OECD
economies – ten mainly small island states – and the OECD countries (used
in comparison estimations). In robustness tests, we add a dummy variable
for ‘artificially’ assigned top scores, or alternatively drop these countries
altogether; both methods do not alter our main results, and even reinforce
them (see below). The descriptive statistics show that power sector reforms
have a relatively low mean of 2.58.
The second policy measure seeks to capture more specific RE policies
by looking at the effects of the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, which also
includes efforts to diversify energy production to include more RETs. For
this, we construct a simple zero-one dummy variable that takes on value
one for all years from 1998 onwards. The adoption of the Kyoto Protocol
arguably also marks a greater awareness of environmental issues, which
is not limited to industrialised countries. The level of ‘environmentalism’
may also contribute to the diffusion of RETs.
As discussed in the previous section, the institutional framework
is also a crucial element of financiers’ information costs on RETs,
signalling a government’s commitment to levelling the playing field for
11 Note that the most highly developed OECD countries have a financial depth (llgdp)
of around 3.7, a commercial bank asset share (dbacba) of 1, and a private credit
share (pcrdbgdp) of nearly 2.8.
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energy providers or even positively encouraging RETs, thereby reducing
uncertainty about future profitability of a RE project. Since there is no
reliable data available on creditor evaluation costs in less developed
economies, these crude policy proxies will have to suffice. We expect a
positive impact of both power sector reforms and the Kyoto dummy on the
RE sector.
In addition to the two energy policy variables, we also use measures
of overall institutional quality in robustness tests. It is in fact likely that
RE projects, like other types of investment projects, benefit from general
political stability, sound regulatory frameworks, effective governance and
secure property rights. Moreover, institutional quality in general could
be correlated with financial sector development in particular, although
correlation coefficients range between a modest 0.38 and 0.5 (with the
exception of pcrdbgdp, which has correlation coefficients between 0.52 and
0.61 with the institutional quality measures). We consider three different
institutional measures: the first is an economic freedom index compiled by
Gwartney et al. (2008) on a five yearly basis until 2000, and on a yearly basis
since 2001 (values for the most recent year were used for intermediate
years before 2000). The index ranges from 1 (worst) to 10 (best) and
includes evaluations of the legal structure and security of property rights,
government size, access to sound money, trade freedom and regulation of
credit, labour and business. The other two measures capture regulatory
quality and government effectiveness, respectively, and are taken from
Kaufmann et al. (2008). These are available for a wider range of countries
than the economic freedom index, but they have only been compiled since
1996. Although institutions change only slowly, we concentrate on the
economic freedom index and only briefly discuss results using the other
two measures, where the 1996 values were used for earlier years.
Several other control variables are included. Income per capita in US$
(gdppc) controls for the possibility that richer and economically more
developed countries may simply have higher energy production. The ratio
of net foreign direct investment inflows to GDP (fdigdp) accounts for non-
domestic investment, including investment by foreign development banks.
We would generally expect this measure to positively affect RE sector
development.12
The prices of the most common conventional fuels may affect investment
in alternative energy sources. We therefore control for the possible
exogenous effects on RE development of the costs of non-RE resources
production by including the average annual market price of crude oil
(oilprice), coal (coalprice) and natural gas (natgasprice), as well as the
respective per capita production rates (oilprodpc, coalprodpc and natgaspdopc).
Furthermore, an interaction term controls for the possibility that large fossil
fuel producers react differently to price changes than small producers or
12 In further tests, we also consider official development assistance by multilaterals,
as well as a variation including aid, to control for the specific effect of multilateral
donor money. This variable proved insignificant and is therefore not shown.
Dummy variables for income groups (classified according to the World Bank)
were also not robust and did not change the main results.
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countries without any fossil fuels at all. In fossil fuel poor countries, we
would expect a clear positive effect of a fossil fuel price increase on the
share of RE in power production. Conversely, the more fossil fuels a country
produces, the less likely it will be to invest in alternative energy resources,
particularly in times of high prices and returns.
We also control for regional effects, as well as two specific time effects
in the estimation period, namely the fall of the Soviet bloc and the start
of the economic (and political) transition of Central and Eastern European
and Central Asian countries, and the financial crisis of East Asia, Latin
America and Russia. We introduce a variable called transition for the former
event, which has value zero until 1991 and then increases with every year
after transition for transition countries, remaining zero for all others. This
is meant to account for the time-diminishing overall negative economic
effect of the transition shock. The variable fincrisis captures the second
event (common to all countries), assuming value zero until 1997, and then
increasing with every successive post-crisis year. Both time variables are
expected to have a positive effect on RE sector development, as investment
in developing and transition countries generally slumped after the shocks
and then gradually picked up again.
Finally, we seek to control for RE potential by including two variables
for the two most important and widely diffused RETs. hydropot measures
the technically exploitable part of gross theoretical hydropower capability,
in twh per year. Where not available, gross theoretical capability was used
instead. The data was taken from the World Energy Council triannual Survey
of Energy Resources (WEC, 1980–2007); intermediate years were filled in with
the latest available value. windpot measures the potential for the currently
most widely employed non-hydro RET, namely wind power. The measure
is based on a recent study by Archer and Jacobson (2005), who present the
first attempt at quantifying global wind power potential from real data. We
construct a dummy variable where zero equals poor or very poor potential,
and one equals moderate to high potential. According to the authors of
the study, moderate (economic) potential starts at wind speeds at 80 m
(the hub-height of modern, 77 m diameter, 1500 kw turbines) between 6.8
and 7.5 m/s. They find substantial potential in all regions, particularly in
North America and (northern) Europe, as well as the southern tip of South
America. Interestingly, the data of Archer and Jacobson (2005) show that
no wind-speed reporting station in mainland China suggests moderate to
high wind power potential. This runs counter to other studies focusing on
China, and to the increasing number of wind farms in China itself. Although
their study is the first to calculate wind power potential with a consistent
methodology for the entire world, their data is available for one year only
(generally 2000), which may be problematic if wind patterns change over
time, for example due to effects of El Nin˜o.
The EIA RE dataset contains several missing years due to newly
independent countries and gives us an unbalanced panel covering 119 non-
OECD countries for the period from 1980 to 2006.13 Results including OECD
countries are also shown for comparison.
13 Missing years in the dependent variables were not changed. Missing years in
the explanatory variables appear to be random: up to two missing years were
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In our main estimations, we perform GLS regressions for the equation
Yit = α1 + α2 Fit + α3 Xit + ωi t , (1)
where Yit is the dependent variable (repc, hydropc or geopc) in country i at
time t, Fit denotes the financial sector development variable and Xit the
vector of control variables. The composite error term ωit consists of the
country-specific error component i and the combined cross-section and
time series error component uit, according to ωit = i + uit.14
The main estimations were performed with one-year-lags for all relevant
independent variables, since financial sector and other economic changes
are not expected to have immediate effects on electricity generation.
Alternative lag durations of up to five years confirm the results (available
upon request), but reduce the number of observations. As there is no clear
theoretical indication regarding the ideal lag number, we show results
using one-year-lags.15 Time-invariant measures – the Kyoto, transition and
financial crisis variables – were not lagged.
In further sensitivity tests that account for the possible dynamic effects
of RE sector development and test the causality, we perform a dynamic
panel data analysis. Linear dynamic panel analysis following Arellano and
Bond (1991) is also designed for panels where the cross-section dimension
exceeds the time dimension, as in our case where we have up to 119 non-
OECD countries and a maximum of 26 years. Dynamic models include
unobserved country-level effects, which by construction are correlated with
the lagged dependent variable, making standard estimators inconsistent.
The Arellano and Bond (1991) first-differenced GMM estimator is consistent
for the parameters of this model, though it still requires that there be no
second-order serial autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors, which we
systematically test for after two-step GMM estimations (not shown).
The basic estimation equation remains much the same as above
(excluding time-invariant regressors), with the addition of the lagged
dependent variable Yi(t − 1):
Yit = β0Yi(t−1) + β1 + β2 Fit + β3 Xit + νi t. (2)
completed with simple linear interpolation; larger holes in the data were left
unaltered. Dummy variables for interpolated years were insignificant.
14 See for example Baltagi (2008) for an extensive discussion of panel data analysis
models.
15 A further point worth considering is that financial sector development – our
main variable of interest – changes only slowly over time, which is an argument
in favour of using one-year-lags to maximise the number of observations. To
test for possible cyclical effects, estimations were also performed with five-year
average values for the dependent variables, using beginning-of-period values for
the independent variables. The estimations consistently showed positive effects
of financial intermediation on RE sector development, but the impact was seldom
significant. Moreover, the reduced number of observations generally led to low
statistical quality of the estimations.
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X1000001X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 15:59:45, subject to the Cambridge Core
254 Christa N. Brunnschweiler
3. Estimation results
It is of particular interest to observe the sign and statistical validity of the
financial sector coefficients α2 and β2. The aim is to observe whether the
development of the RE sector is – other things equal – positively influenced
by the financial intermediary sector in general (captured by the broad
financial depth measure llgdp), and especially by the commercial banking
system (proxied by the commercial bank asset share dbacba and the private
credit allocation pcrdbgdp). Controlling for variables which affect RE or
financial sector development allows us to draw conclusions on the causal
impact of finance on RETs.
3.1. Generalised least squares estimations
We begin by presenting random-effects GLS estimations according to
equation (1) for our unbalanced panel of non-OECD countries.16 Table 2
shows results for a parsimonious, basic specification including a financial
sector variable, income per capita, FDI/GDP, the two energy sector policy
measures psreform and kyoto and regional dummy variables. Columns (1)–
(3) give results with the total RE produced per capita (repc), while columns
(4)–(6) show results for hydroelectric power (hydropc), and columns (7)–(9)
for non-hydro power generation (geopc).
First of all, it is striking that all three financial sector development
measures have the expected positive sign in all but the very last
specification, and are moreover mostly significant. As far as the magnitude
of the effects is concerned, in terms of beta coefficients we see for example
from column (1) that a one-standard-deviation increase in the commercial
bank asset share would – other things equal – lead to a small increase of
0.03 standard deviations in the RE per capita produced ((0.23 × 0.091)/0.78).
The effects on the overall RE generation per capita are slightly smaller in
magnitude for the other two measures of financial sector development,
weighing in at around 0.02. The effects are similarly minimal when we
consider only hydro power, with beta coefficients again around 0.02.
However, the effect of financial intermediation appears to be much more
substantial when we consider only non-hydro RE: a one-standard-deviation
increase in the commercial bank asset share leads to an increase in geopc
by 0.184 of a standard deviation (using results from column (7)). The
large negative effect of ‘financial depth’ in the last column is puzzling:
it appears that financial sector development in general diminishes RET use,
while commercial banking increases it. However, this effect is not robust to
dropping outliers (see below).
Regarding the other covariates in table 2, we find on the one hand that
power sector reforms have a counter-intuitive effect on RE generation: the
coefficient has a negative sign in all but the estimations using non-hydro
16 Hausman specification tests consistently showed no advantage of using fixed-
effects estimations, and we therefore show only random-effects results to include
the impact of time-invariant variables. Results with fixed-effects estimations
(available upon request) were very similar to the random-effects estimations, but
had lower explanatory power. See Baltagi (2008) for more details on the Hausman
specification test.
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Table 2. Financial development and per capita RE generation in non-OECD countries
(1) repc (2) repc (3) repc (4) hydropc (5) hydropc (6) hydropc (7) geopc (8) geopc (9) geopc
dbacba 0.091c 0.073c 0.016c
(3.63) (2.98) (5.83)
pcrdbgdp 0.082b 0.079b 0.002
(2.31) (2.28) (0.59)
llgdp 0.053 0.061a −0.008b
(1.45) (1.71) (2.08)
fdigdp 0.001c −0.0003 −0.0002 0.001c −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.00001 −0.0001 −0.0001
(3.46) (0.36) (0.34) (3.54) (0.26) (0.23) (0.24) (0.92) (0.98)
gdppc 0.00001c 0.000003 0.000003a 0.000004b 0.000002 0.000002 0.000001c 0.000001c 0.000001c
(3.03) (1.58) (1.87) (2.36) (1.03) (1.23) (4.54) (3.84) (4.80)
psreform −0.099b −0.102b −0.102b −0.1b −0.103b −0.104b 0.001 0.001 0.001
(2.33) (2.20) (2.21) (2.34) (2.23) (2.24) (0.79) (1.17) (1.32)
kyoto 0.026c 0.038c 0.038c 0.023c 0.033c 0.032c 0.004c 0.006c 0.006c
(3.67) (4.85) (4.80) (3.27) (4.25) (4.15) (5.19) (6.51) (6.85)
eca 0.217 0.278 0.272 0.229 0.293 0.289 −0.014c −0.016b −0.017c
(0.92) (1.05) (1.03) (0.97) (1.11) (1.09) (2.61) (2.56) (2.79)
mena −0.706b −0.727a −0.732a −0.694b −0.714a −0.722a −0.013a −0.013 −0.011
(2.10) (1.90) (1.92) (2.07) (1.87) (1.90) (1.67) (1.53) (1.22)
ssa −0.655c −0.670c −0.672c −0.648c −0.660c −0.662c −0.009a −0.011b −0.012b
(2.99) (2.87) (2.88) (2.96) (2.83) (2.84) (1.76) (2.04) (2.16)
Observations 2450 2179 2192 2450 2179 2192 2450 2179 2192
Countries 119 107 107 119 107 107 119 107 107
R2 within 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.05
R2 between 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.13
R2 overall 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11
Notes: All regressions are random-effects GLS on sample panel of non-OECD countries from 1980 to 2006 with one-year-lags for all
indicators except psreform, kyoto and the three regional dummies. Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. Constant term included in all
specifications (not shown). a, b, c statistically significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively.
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RE. Note however that in robustness tests including a dummy variable for
countries that were ‘artificially’ assigned a top score of six for power sector
reforms, or alternatively dropped from the estimations, the significance on
the negative coefficients disappeared, while the positive coefficients became
significant (results available upon request). On the other hand, the results
show a consistently strong positive RE sector development trend since the
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, suggesting that the connected emission-
reduction policies (or possibly the greater environmental awareness linked
to the widespread discussion of the Protocol) have led to greater RET
diffusion. In additional estimations (available upon request), the possibility
of time-specific effects was further investigated by including year and five-
year period dummies. Both variations showed that RE sector development
has picked up markedly since the mid-1990s and the trend even accelerated
after 2000, lending further support to the idea that the Kyoto Protocol has
indeed had positive effects.
Per capita income has the expected positive sign and is often highly signi-
ficant, confirming that richer countries also produce more energy. The FDI
shares of GDP however have no consistent sign, being positive and highly
significant in columns (1) and (4), and negative and insignificant otherwise.
Finally, there appear to be significant differences in Middle Eastern and
North African countries (mena), which include most OPEC countries, and
sub-Saharan African countries (ssa): both regions have lower RE electricity
generation on average than other non-OECD countries. Non-hydro RE use
is significantly lower especially in sub-Saharan Africa and Europe and
Central Asia (eca), in the latter case probably due to Soviet-era policies.
The first results are encouraging, but still leave room for some omitted
variables bias: the explanatory power given by the R-squareds, though not
unusually low for such a large and varied sample of countries, is modest.
In table 3, we therefore consider additional variables. We control for overall
institutional quality (econfree) and the effects of oil production and prices.
For space reasons, we concentrate on the two narrower financial sector
variables dbacba (panel A) and pcrdbgdp (panel B) and do not show results
for hydropc (which are very similar to those for repc), as well as for the control
variables income per capita, FDI/GDP and the regional dummies.
Panel A shows that commercial banking (dbacba) continues to have a
strong positive effect on RE use. The coefficients in columns (1)–(3) for all
types of RETs remain in the same order of magnitude as in table 2; however,
the coefficients in columns (4)–(6) increase remarkably, with beta coefficients
for a one-standard-deviation change in commercial banking development
of 0.29. This indicates that this particular area of the financial sector can have
a real impact on the adoption of non-hydro RETs, even once we take into
account the policy and institutional environment. The same can however
not be said for credit to the private sector (pcrdbgdp) in panel B, which is not
robust to controlling for institutional quality (econfree) and oil production
and prices.17
17 In additional estimations with the institutional quality measures compiled by
Kaufman et al. (2008), pcrdbgdp proves significant at the five per cent level for repc
and hydropc, but not geopc. Results available upon request.
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Table 3. Robustness analysis with additional regressors
(1) repc (2) repc (3) repc (4) geopc (5) geopc (6) geopc
Panel A
dbacba 0.086b 0.086b 0.087b 0.025c 0.025c 0.025c
(2.34) (2.34) (2.37) (6.07) (6.09) (5.99)
psreform −0.102b −0.101b −0.101b 0.001 0.001 0.001
(2.00) (1.97) (1.98) (0.54) (0.73) (0.73)
kyoto 0.022b 0.022b 0.023b 0.005c 0.004c 0.004c
(2.05) (2.04) (2.12) (3.74) (3.60) (3.31)
econfree 0.013a 0.013a 0.014a 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.81) (1.81) (1.84) (1.39) (1.22) (0.98)
oilprodpc −0.081 −0.057 −0.043b −0.026
(0.21) (0.15) (2.19) (1.16)
oilprice −0.0004 0.0001a
(0.87) (1.81)
oilprodpc∗ −0.004 −0.001a
oilprice (0.79) (1.72)
Observations 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829
Countries 92 92 92 92 92 92
R2 within 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.10
R2 between 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.06
R2 overall 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08
Panel B
pcrdbgdp 0.053 0.0538 0.05 −0.004 −0.005 −0.005
(1.28) (1.29) (1.18) (0.80) (1.01) (1.03)
psreform −0.105b −0.105b −0.105b 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.96) (1.96) (1.97) (0.85) (1.05) (1.07)
kyoto 0.027b 0.027b 0.0294c 0.005c 0.005c 0.004c
(2.49) (2.49) (2.68) (3.90) (3.79) (3.42)
econfree 0.020c 0.020c 0.022c 0.004c 0.003c 0.003c
(2.83) (2.82) (2.99) (4.10) (4.08) (3.80)
oilprodpc 0.046 0.058 −0.036a −0.019
(0.14) (0.17) (1.83) (0.86)
oilprice −0.001 0.0001b
(1.49) (2.02)
oilprodpc∗ −0.001 −0.001
oilprice (0.24) (1.62)
Observations 1756 1756 1756 1756 1756 1756
Countries 89 89 89 89 89 89
R2 within 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07
R2 between 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.16
R2 overall 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12
Notes: All regressions are random-effects GLS on sample panel of non-OECD
countries, with one-year-lags for all indicators except (psreform), kyoto, and the
regional dummies (not shown). Also not shown are the coefficients for gdppc
and fdigdp, as well as the constant term. Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. a,
b, c statistically significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively.
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The measure of economic freedom (econfree) has the expected positive
sign and is mostly significant, especially in panel B, indicating that a
stable institutional framework positively affects investments in the RE
power sector. Oil production and oil prices seem to have most impact
on the use of non-hydro RETs (columns (4)–(6)): oil producers have less
electricity generated with wind, solar, geothermal and other non-hydro RE.
An oil price increase, on the other hand, makes investment in these RETs
more worthwhile, indicated by the positive sign. However, the interaction
term oilprodpc × oilprice shows that this ‘substitution effect’ away from
conventional fossil fuels to RETs is less pronounced in oil-producing
countries and may even be completely cancelled out. For example, at the
sample mean oil production of 0.04 barrels per day and per capita, an
oil price increase of one standard deviation (11.31 US$ per barrel) would –
other things equal – lead to an increase in the non-hydro RE use in electricity
generation of 0.034 standard deviations: a negligible effect.18 However, the
same price increase in the relatively largest oil producer (Qatar, with 2.11
barrels per day and per capita) would hypothetically lead to a massive
decrease in the use of non-hydro RE of over one standard deviation.
Table A of the appendix shows results using coal and natural gas. The
pattern for natural gas (panel B) is similar to that for oil, while the effects
of coal price increases are consistent across all countries, coal producers
and otherwise (panel A). This suggests that (major) oil and natural gas
producers generally have lower levels of RE use, probably reflecting
different investment incentives.
In additional estimations shown in table B in the appendix, we found
that the economic transition of former East Bloc countries had a weakly
significant impact on RE generation: power production with all types
of RE has increased steadily since the transition shock. The financial
markets shock of 1997–1998, however, had no strong impact on overall RE
production in developing and transition countries; but non-hydro RET use
has increased significantly since the financial crisis of the late 1990s. Note
however that this positive impact may be combined with a post-Kyoto
effect, since the time periods coincide: in fact, the simple Kyoto dummy
variable – which is otherwise consistently highly significant – loses its
strength here. Our measures of RE potential prove inconclusive: both have
positive signs, but neither approaches conventional levels of significance.
Finally, we compare different samples in table C, starting with the
entire world in panel A. Credit to the private sector (pcrdbgdp) is the only
significantly positive financial sector variable, while financial depth (llgdp)
once again shows a significant negative impact on non-hydro RE use. Note
that the effect of (pcrdbgdp) is much higher than we saw previously for
non-OECD countries, and strongly significant for all types of RE, while at
the same time financial depth (llgdp) shows an increased negative effect on
geopc.
Interestingly, there appears to be no consistent post-Kyoto effect in
the entire world sample: this may point to policies on RE which were
18 Using results in panel A: ((0.04 × 11.31 × (−0.001)) + (11.31 × 0.0001).
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already being enforced prior to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol.
For example, according to the World Energy Council’s Survey of Energy
Resources of 1998, many OECD countries were already close to realising
their technically exploitable hydropower capacity at the time. They were
probably farther away from their capacity frontiers as regards non-hydro
RETs; the Kyoto dummy is marginally significant in column (9), indicating
the possibility of positive effects of the commitments undertaken within the
Kyoto Protocol. However, the effect is too weak to draw any more definite
conclusions.
Panel B includes only low- to upper-middle-income non-OECD countries
(no high-income): the main effects from tables 2–3 are confirmed, and the
explanatory power increases substantially. Panel C shows results for non-
OECD countries without outliers Paraguay (as regards overall RE and hydro
electricity generation) and Costa Rica (for non-hydro production), which
again confirm the main results. Overall, the positive impact of financial
sector development on RE, and especially non-hydro electricity generation,
seems remarkably robust. Note that the negative effect of llgdp on geopc
appears to be driven by the outlier Costa Rica, as it disappears when we
drop that country.
3.2. Dynamic panel data estimations
The results of the panel estimations shown above are very suggestive of
a robust impact of financial sector development – especially commercial
bank asset share and private credit share – on RE production in non-OECD
countries. However, the explanatory power of the specifications is generally
between 9 and 20 per cent of the overall sample variation, indicating some
possible omitted variable bias; moreover, energy sector development may
display a dynamic development over time. In order to address these points
and also confirm the causal relationship, we perform dynamic one-step
GMM estimations after Arellano and Bond (1991).19 Table 4 presents the
results of the basic regressions using equation (2). The highly significant
lagged dependent variables suggest that a dynamic approach is justified.
Beyond this, we note that the results from the dynamic estimations confirm
the positive and significant effect of financial sector development on RE
production. A post-Kyoto (policy) effect is noticeable only for non-hydro
RETs, shown in columns (7)–(9). The magnitudes of the single impacts
remain similar to those seen above with GLS, though they are slightly
higher for repc and hydropc, and slightly lower for geopc.
In table 5, we show results with additional variables econfree and oil
production and prices, similar to table 3. For space reasons, we concentrate
on commercial banking (dbacba), which again proves the most robust
financial sector variable, particularly as regards geopc. Note that the
coefficients for the commercial banking share now approach the magnitudes
seen in table 2 above. However, the oil variables no longer appear to have
any impact, and in some cases even change signs. There is also no longer
19 Tests performed after two-step GMM estimations with the same specifications
show that the overidentifying restrictions are valid, and that there is no indication
of second-order autocorrelation.
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Table 4. Dynamic panel estimations
(1) repc (2) repc (3) repc (4) hydropc (5) hydropc (6) hydropc (7) geopc (8) geopc (9) geopc
dbacba 0.096c 0.093c 0.011c
(3.16) (3.07) (7.41)
llgdp 0.093a 0.092a 0.001
(1.95) (1.94) (0.55)
pcrdbgdp 0.116b 0.122c −0.00004
(2.45) (2.58) (−0.024)
gdppc −0.0000001 0.000004 0.000004 −0.000001 0.000003 0.000003 0.000001c 0.000001c 0.000001c
(−0.043) (1.50) (1.46) (−0.32) (1.27) (1.18) (3.61) (4.62) (4.82)
fdigdp 0.001b −0.0001 −0.0002 0.001b −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.00001 0.0000001 0.000001
(2.27) (−0.21) (−0.25) (2.32) (−0.19) (−0.23) (−0.61) (0.0034) (0.040)
kyoto 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.001b 0.001c 0.001c
(0.99) (0.99) (0.73) (0.61) (0.69) (0.36) (2.56) (3.16) (3.38)
L.repc 0.697c 0.704c 0.702c
(49.0) (48.2) (47.9)
L.hydropc 0.696c 0.702c 0.700c
(48.9) (48.0) (47.7)
L.geopc 0.838c 0.848c 0.848c
(86.7) (84.9) (84.6)
Observations 2703 2441 2427 2703 2441 2427 2703 2441 2427
Countries 136 124 124 136 124 124 136 124 124
Notes: All regressions are Arellano–Bond dynamic panel regressions using sample panel of non-OECD countries with one-year-lags
for all indicators. Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. Constant term included in all specifications (not shown). a, b, c statistically
significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively.
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Table 5. Dynamic panel estimations with additional regressors
(1) repc (2) repc (3) repc (4) hydropc (5) hydropc (6) hydropc (7) geopc (8) geopc (9) geopc
dbacba 0.083a 0.083a 0.083a 0.084a 0.085a 0.085a 0.015c 0.015c 0.016c
(1.84) (1.85) (1.82) (1.89) (1.90) (1.88) (7.28) (7.28) (7.35)
gdppc 0.000002 0.000002 0.000002 0.000002 0.000002 0.000002 0.0000004c 0.0000005b 0.0000004b
(0.64) (0.66) (0.59) (0.65) (0.67) (0.61) (2.61) (2.52) (2.14)
fdigdp −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001
(−0.72) (−0.75) (−0.71) (−0.63) (−0.65) (−0.62) (−0.94) (−0.91) (−0.93)
kyoto 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.31) (0.29) (0.26) (0.11) (0.090) (0.058) (1.35) (1.37) (1.38)
econfree 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
(1.06) (1.07) (1.23) (0.46) (0.46) (0.64) (0.92) (0.94) (0.81)
oilprodpc −0.101 −0.173 −0.091 −0.162 0.013 0.017
(−0.26) (−0.44) (−0.24) (−0.42) (0.52) (0.67)
oilprice −0.0003 −0.0003 0.00002
(−0.56) (−0.57) (1.03)
oilprodpc∗ 0.008 0.007 −0.0003
oilprice (0.90) (0.82) (−0.62)
L.repc 0.698c 0.698c 0.698c
(42.6) (42.6) (42.5)
L.hydropc 0.696c 0.696c 0.696c
(42.5) (42.5) (42.4)
L.geopc 0.827c 0.827c 0.826c
(71.0) (70.9) (70.2)
Observations 1907 1907 1907 1907 1907 1907 1907 1907 1907
Countries 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: All regressions are Arellano–Bond dynamic panel regressions using sample panel of non-OECD countries with one-year-lags
for all indicators. Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. gdppc, fdigdp and constant term included in all specifications (not shown). a, b, c
statistically significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively.
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any observable ‘Kyoto effect’ on RET use in electricity production. Overall,
the results for the dynamic GMM estimations prove weaker than for
GLS, although financial sector development – in particular the commercial
banking share – still has significant positive impacts on RE use.
In sum, the results of the empirical analysis support the idea that
financial intermediary development encourages the growth of the RE
sector. However, the effect is quite small in magnitude when we consider
the beta coefficients: only for the case of non-hydro RE is the impact
economically important throughout the specifications. Moreover, not all
financial measures are equally important: commercial banking seems to
deliver the best support for the realisation of RE projects. As regards policy,
we find an ambiguous impact of the power sector reform index; it is difficult
to explain this, as unfortunately it is a time-invariant index and does not
specifically examine RE policies, but looks at how level the playing field
is for all types of resources and producers. The more RE-relevant Kyoto
dummy however shows that there has been a clear positive development
in RET use in transition and developing countries since the adoption of the
Kyoto Protocol in late 1997. This may be due to the growing number of
CDM projects, or to a growing environmental awareness with domestic RE
policies, or both. Finally, the findings are robust to the inclusion of other
covariates which could influence RE sector development, and to various
different sample sizes.
4. Discussion and conclusions
This paper examines the effects of financial intermediation on the
development of the RE sector in a series of panel data estimations for
the period 1980–2006. Energy production today relies on exhaustible and
polluting conventional fossil fuels, and a larger share of alternative energy
sources in primary energy production would not only have positive
environmental effects, but would also bring greater energy security for
future generations, as RETs exploit domestic RE resources. The increased
use of RETs is one of the instruments to achieve the emission-reduction
goals of the Kyoto Protocol, and it is also mentioned for example by the UN
as a crucial part of achieving sustainable development.
The focus is on non-OECD developing and transition countries. Energy
firms in less developed economies are largely dependent on external
financing to realise new projects; in turn, external financing in these
countries relies on the banking sector, as stock and bond markets, as well as
venture capitalism, are not well enough established to provide large-scale
funding. However, the underdevelopment of the banking sector, in addition
to specific RE-sector problems such as high up-front and information costs
and long lead times, hamper the emergence of RE entrepreneurs. The
financing problems are combined with the greater issue of energy sector
regulations and RET policies, which do not always offer a level playing
field for all energy producers, as fossil fuel generation often benefits from
special incentives, as well as the advantage of well-established technologies
and hence fewer unknowns for potential investors.
The empirical estimations, using RE electricity generation per capita as a
proxy for RE sector development, show that financial sector development
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does indeed have a robust and significant positive effect on the amount of
RE produced, which is independent of (or in addition to) energy policy.
We found that the effect is particularly large when we consider non-
hydropower RE (i.e., geothermal, solar, wind, wood and waste), where
a one-standard-deviation increase in our financial intermediation measures
leads to an increase in non-hydro RE of up to 0.3 of a standard deviation. Of
the three financial sector measures used, the commercial bank asset share
and the private credit share proved the most robust, while financial depth is
probably too broad a measure to adequately capture the more bank-focused
development that is assumed to be important in developing and emerging
economies. The results are robust to controlling for additional effects and
to different sample specifications.
The findings also suggest that there has been a strong positive post-Kyoto
effect in RET use in non-OECD countries, though we cannot pinpoint the
exact cause to either the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms such as CDM and JI, or
a growing environmental awareness with consequent domestic RE policies.
The power sector reforms indicator had an ambiguous impact on RE sector
development: the effect on overall RE use and hydropower tended to be
negative, while the influence on non-hydro RETs was more positive. The
lack of a clearer conclusion in this regard may be due to the data: the power
sector reform index provided by ESMAP (1999) is available for only one
year (1998), and concentrates on evaluating competitiveness and creating
a level playing field for all types of energy resources, with no particular
focus on RETs. Moreover, the mixed reform results to date in non-OECD
countries have led to a general rethinking of the objectives and underlying
assumptions of power sector reform (e.g., Williams and Ghanadan, 2006),
which will hopefully lead to more adequate measures (and incentives) of
reform progress.
As regards possible differences in fossil fuel producing countries, there is
indeed some indication that (major) oil and natural gas producers generally
see less electricity generation with RETs, particularly non-hydro RE, than
other countries. Fossil fuel price increases likely weaken the incentives to
invest in RETs in major producers, while their effect is opposite in smaller
producers and fossil fuel-poor countries.
The approach offers a first attempt at empirically verifying the role of
finance for the development of the RE industry. The availability of quality
data on RE development and investment has so far hampered empirical
studies in this area; further work is needed to corroborate the results,
especially in the form of case studies. Additionally, it will be interesting
to see the future impacts and developments of the Kyoto Protocol.
Any policy recommendations must remain tentative at this point.
Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that the financial sector does indeed
have a measurable impact on the emergence of RE producers. A
regulatory framework aimed at fostering the RE sector cannot neglect the
financing aspects, and particularly the availability of private sector financial
intermediation. Developing and strengthening the financial sector of course
has greater macroeconomic benefits, as demonstrated by the vast finance-
and-growth literature; however, it also has a non-negligible influence on
the success of RE, especially the most recent non-hydro RETs.
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X1000001X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 15:59:45, subject to the Cambridge Core
264 Christa N. Brunnschweiler
References
Archer, C.L., and M.Z. Jacobson (2005), ‘Evaluation of global wind power’, Journal
of Geophysical Research 110: D12110.
Arellano, M., and S. Bond (1991), ‘Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte
Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations’, Review of Economic
Studies 58(2): 277–97.
Babbar, S., and J. Schuster (1998), ‘Power project finance: experience in developing
countries’, World Bank RMC Discussion Paper No. 119.
Baltagi, B.H. (2008), Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, 2nd Edn, Chichester, UK: John
Wiley & Sons.
Barbier, E. (2009), A Global Green New Deal, Report prepared for the Economics and
Trade Branch, Division of Technology, Industry and Economics, UNEP, February
2009.
Beck, T., A. Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and R. Levine (2000), ‘A new database on financial
development and structure’, World Bank Economic Review 14: 597–605.
Beck, T., A. Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, L. Laeven, and V. Maksimovic (2004a), ‘The
determinants of financing obstacles’, Journal of International Money and Finance
25(6): 932–952.
Beck, T., A. Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and V. Maksimovic (2004b), ‘Bank competition and
access to finance: international evidence’, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking
36(3): 627–648.
Brunnschweiler, C.N. (2006), ‘Financing the alternative: renewable energy in
developing and transition countries’, Economics Working Paper Series 06/49,
ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.
Carlin, W., and C. Mayer (2003), ‘Finance, investment and growth’, Journal of Financial
Economics 69(1): 191–226.
Churchill, A.A., and R.J. Saunders (1989), ‘Financing of the energy sector in
developing countries’, World Bank Industry and Energy Department Working
Paper, Energy Series Paper No. 14.
Deffeyes, K.S. (2005), Beyond Oil: The View from Hubbert’s Peak, New York: Hill and
Wang.
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, A., and R. Levine (2001), Financial Structure and Economic Growth:
A Cross-Country Comparison of Banks, Markets, and Development, Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, A., and V. Maksimovic (1999), ‘Institutions, financial markets, and
firm debt maturity’, Journal of Financial Economics 54: 295–336.
Economist, The (2009), ‘2020 vision: The peak oil debate’, December 10th.
EIA (Energy Information Administration) (2000), ‘Long term world oil
supply, presentation prepared for the American Association of Petro-
leum Geologists’ [Online], http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/
presentations/2000/long_term_supply/index.htm (posted July 28, 2000).
EIA (Energy Information Administration) (2006), ‘International energy annual’
[Online], http://www.eia.doe.gov/ (release December 8, 2008).
ESMAP (1999), ‘Global energy sector reform in developing countries: a scorecard’,
Vol. 1, World Bank, ESM219 (July 99).
Gwartney, J., R. Lawson, J. Hall, and S. Norton (2008), Economic Freedom of the
World 2008 Annual Report, Economic Freedom Network.
Head, C. (2000), ‘Financing of private hydropower projects’, World Bank Discussion
Paper No. 420.
Huang, Y., and T. Barker (2009), ‘The Clean Development Mechanism and sustainable
development: a panel data analysis’, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research
Working Paper no. 130.
IEA (International Energy Agency) (2003), World Energy Investment Outlook, 2003
Insights, Paris: International Energy Agency.
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X1000001X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 15:59:45, subject to the Cambridge Core
Environment and Development Economics 265
IEA (International Energy Agency) (2008), World Energy Outlook 2008, Paris:
International Energy Agency.
Ishiguro, M., and T. Akiyama (1995), ‘Electricity demand in Asia and the effects
on energy supply and the investment environment’, World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper No. 1557.
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2008), ‘Governance matters VII:
Governance indicators for 1996–2007’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
No. 4654.
King, R.G., and R. Levine (1993)a), ‘Finance and growth: schumpeter might be right’,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 108: 717–738.
King, R.G., and R. Levine (1993)b), ‘Finance, entrepreneurship, and growth’, Journal
of Monetary Economics 32: 513–542.
Levine, R., and S. Zervos (1998), ‘Stock markets, banks, and economic growth’, The
American Economic Review 88(3): 537–558.
Levine, R., N. Loayza, and T. Beck (2000), ‘Financial intermediation and growth:
causality and causes’, Journal of Monetary Economics 46(1): 31–77.
MacLean, J.C., and J.M. Siegel (2007), ‘Financing Mechanisms and Public/Private
Risk Sharing Instruments for Financing Small Scale Renewable Energy
Equipment and Projects’, report prepared for UNEP and GEF [Online],
http://www.uneptie.org/energy/activities/frm/pdf/SSRE.pdf.
Pacudan, R. (2005), ‘The Clean Development Mechanism: new instrument in
financing renewable energy technologies’, in A. Iacomelli (ed.), Renewable Energies
for Central Asia Countries: Economic, Environmental and Social Impacts, Springer,
pp. 27–42.
Painuly, J.P., and N. Wohlgemuth (2006), ‘Renewable energy financing - what can
we learn from experience in developing countries?’, Energy Studies Review 14(2):
154–170.
Renner, M., S. Sweeney, and J. Kubit (2008), Green Jobs: Towards a Decent Work in a
Sustainable, Low-carbon World, Geneva: UNEP/ILO/IOE/ITUC.
Sonntag-O’Brien, V., and E. Usher (2004a), ‘Financing options for renewable
energy’, Environmental Finance, Renewables Finance special issue, [online], http://
www.environmental-finance.com/2004/0504may/financ.htm (posted May 2004,
updated July 4, 2008).
Sonntag-O’Brien, V., and E. Usher (2004b), ‘Mobilising Finance for Renewable
Energy, Thematic background paper for the International Conference for Renew-
able Energies’, Bonn, [Online], http://www.renewables2004.de/pdf/tbd/TBP05-
financing.pdf, January 2004.
Tadesse, S. (2002), ‘Financial architecture and economic performance: international
evidence’, Journal of Financial Intermediation 11: 429–454.
Tharakan, P.J., J. de Castro, and T. Kroeger (2007), ‘Energy sector assistance in
developing countries: current trends and policy recommendations’, Energy Policy
35: 734–738.
Tirpak, D., and H. Adams (2008), ‘Bilateral and multilateral financial assistance for
the energy sector of developing countries’, Climate Policy 8: 135–151.
UN Commission on Sustainable Development (2007), Report on the fifteenth session,
Economic and Social Council Official Records, Supplement No. 9.
UNEP FI (2004), Renewable Energy, United Nations Environment Programme
Finance Initiative Climate Change Working Group, CEO Briefing (June
2004).
van Hulle, F., G. van Roekel, J. de Jongh, J. Borchgrevink, J. C. Lopez, and E. F. Vindas
(2003), Evaluation of the environmental impact of the 20MW Tejona wind power
project, Costa Rica, ECN report no. ECN-C-02-93.
World Energy Council (WEC) (1980–2007), Survey of Energy Resources, London: World
Energy Council.
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X1000001X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 15:59:45, subject to the Cambridge Core
266 Christa N. Brunnschweiler
Williams, J.H., and R. Ghanadan (2006), ‘Electricity reform in developing and
transition countries: a reappraisal’, Energy 31: 815–844.
Wohlgemuth, N., and J.P. Painuly (1999), ‘Promoting private sector financing
of commercial investments in renewable energy technologies, in Finance for
Sustainable Development: Testing New Policy Approaches, United Nations.
World Bank (1999), Energy and Development Report, Washington, D.C.: IBRD/World
Bank.
World Bank (2002), Financing for Sustainable Development, Washington, D.C.:
IBRD/World Bank.
World Bank (2003), Power for Development: A Review of the World Bank
Group’s Experience with Private Participation in the Electricity Sector, Operations
Evaluation Department, Washington, D.C.: IBRD/World Bank.
Appendix: Definitions and sources
All data were collected for non-OECD countries (as of 1980 – the recent
OECD members Czech Republic, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, Poland and
Slovakia were included in the estimations) and for OECD countries for
comparison, for the years 1980–2006 (where available).
Variable Definition Source
repc Net total renewable resource electric
power generation in billion kwh
per capita – including hydro,
wood and waste, geothermal,
solar and wind.
Own calculation
from EIA (2006)
hydropc Net hydroelectric power generation
in billion kwh per capita.
Own calculation
from EIA (2006)
geopc Net non-hydro renewable resource
electric power generation in
billion kwh per capita – including
geothermal, wind, solar, and
wood and waste.
Own calculation
from EIA (2006)
dbacba Deposit money bank assets /
(deposit money + central) bank
assets (i.e., commercial bank asset
share versus Central Bank).
Beck et al. (2000)
pcrdbgdp Private credit by deposit money
banks/GDP.
Beck et al. (2000)
llgdp Liquid Liabilities/GDP (financial
depth).
Beck et al. (2000)
psreform Qualitative power sector reform
indicator for 1998, ranging from
zero (no reforms) to six (all
relevant reforms implemented in
all areas). All OECD and other
high-income countries not
included in the original study
were assigned a value of 6.
ESMAP (1999)
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Variable Definition Source
kyoto Dummy variable taking value one
from 1998 onwards (post-Kyoto
Protocol period).
Own construction
gdppc GDP per capita (PPP adjusted) in
current US$.
World Development
Indicators (WDI)
econfree Economic freedom summary index. Gwartney et al. (2008)
fdigdp Foreign direct investment net
inflows (%GDP).
WDI
oilprodpc Per capita oil production in barrels
per day.
Own calculation from
EIA (2006)
oilprice Crude oil prices measured in US$
per barrel, in current dollars.
British Petroleum
natgasprodpc Per capita Natural gas production in
btu equivalents.
British Petroleum
natgasprice Natural gas price in US$ per million
btu, in current dollars.
British Petroleum
coalprodpc Per capita coal production in million
tonnes.
British Petroleum.
coalprice Coal price in US$ per tonne, in
current dollars.
British Petroleum
transition Measure for transition shock in
Central and Eastern Europe as
well as former Soviet countries.
Years until 1991 have value zero,
and post-transition years take on
increasing values. All other
countries receive value zero
throughout the period.
Own construction
fincrisis Financial crisis measure, taking
value zero until 1997, then
increasing with every post-crisis
year.
Own construction
eca Dummy variable for countries of
Europe and Central Asia.
mena Dummy variable for countries of the
Middle East and Northern Africa.
ssa Dummy variable for countries of
sub-Saharan Africa.
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Table A. Robustness analysis with coal and natural gas production
(1) repc (2) repc (3) repc (4) hydropc (5) hydropc (6) hydropc (7) geopc (8) geopc (9) geopc
Panel A
dbacba 0.102c 0.086c 0.015c
(3.40) (2.90) (4.74)
pcrdbgdp 0.120c 0.110b 0.008
(2.65) (2.46) (1.63)
llgdp 0.057 0.058 −0.004
(1.24) (1.29) (0.83)
psreform −0.098b −0.101b −0.101b −0.099b −0.102b −0.103b 0.001 0.001 0.001
(2.27) (2.13) (2.14) (2.30) (2.17) (2.18) (0.73) (0.93) (1.00)
kyoto 0.028c 0.033c 0.034c 0.025c 0.028c 0.029c 0.004c 0.005c 0.005c
(3.51) (3.73) (3.80) (3.21) (3.28) (3.33) (4.43) (5.45) (5.73)
coalprodpc 0.003 −0.021 −0.015 0.011 −0.01 −0.005 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003
(0.1) (0.55) (0.39) (0.37) (0.26) (0.13) (1.60) (1.38) (1.15)
coalprice 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001b 0.0001b
(0.65) (1.17) (1.01) (0.55) (0.96) (0.80) (1.48) (2.33) (2.36)
coalprodpc∗ 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
coalprice (0.78) (1.09) (1.06) (0.64) (0.92) (0.90) (1.60) (1.62) (1.53)
Observations 1965 1756 1770 1965 1756 1770 1965 1756 1770
Countries 119 107 107 119 107 107 119 107 107
r2within 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.0600
r2between 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.11
r2overall 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.10
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Panel B
dbacba 0.110c 0.093c 0.016c
(4.10) (3.52) (5.37)
pcrdbgdp 0.093b 0.088b 0.003
(2.35) (2.27) (0.79)
llgdp 0.043 0.050 −0.009b
(1.04) (1.24) (1.98)
psreform −0.097b −0.101b −0.101b −0.097b −0.102b −0.102b 0.001 0.001 0.001
(2.26) (2.16) (2.15) (2.27) (2.18) (2.17) (0.75) (1.11) (1.28)
kyoto 0.023c 0.0304c 0.032c 0.021c 0.026c 0.027c 0.003c 0.005c 0.005c
(3.04) (3.56) (3.70) (2.77) (3.14) (3.25) (3.87) (4.80) (5.12)
natgasprodpc −0.152 −0.115 −0.179 −0.147 −0.099 −0.163 −0.035 −0.036 −0.035
(0.44) (0.34) (0.52) (0.44) (0.29) (0.49) (1.01) (1.00) (0.98)
natgasprice 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001b 0.001c 0.001c
(0.84) (1.08) (0.93) (0.67) (0.77) (0.59) (1.99) (2.94) (3.16)
natgasprodpc∗ −0.002 0.002 0.009 0.005 0.006 0.014 −0.001 −0.001 −0.003
natgasprice (0.04) (0.03) (0.15) (0.09) (0.11) (0.25) (0.25) (0.17) (0.40)
Observations 2178 1943 1956 2178 1943 1956 2178 1943 1956
Countries 119 107 107 119 107 107 119 107 107
R2 within 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.06
R2 between 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.14
R2 overall 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12
Notes: All regressions are random-effects panel regressions; fdigdp, gdppc, regional dummy variables and constant term included but
not shown. One-year-lags for all indicators with the exception of psreform and regional dummies. Absolute z-statistics in parentheses.
a, b, c statistically significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively.
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Table B. RE potential and time shock variables
(1) repc (2) repc (3) repc (4) hydropc (5) hydropc (6) hydropc (7) geopc (8) geopc (9) geopc
Panel A
dbacba 0.101c 0.080c 0.016c
(3.43) (2.79) (5.82)
pcrdbgdp 0.055 0.062 0.002
(1.33) (1.50) (0.59)
llgdp 0.029 0.05 −0.009b
(0.63) (1.11) (2.10)
psreform −0.099b −0.101a −0.100a −0.099b −0.102a −0.101a 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.97) (1.83) (1.83) (2.00) (1.88) (1.88) (0.62) (1.03) (1.18)
kyoto 0.021c 0.033c 0.032c 0.019b 0.029c 0.028c 0.004c 0.006c 0.006c
(2.58) (3.52) (3.48) (2.34) (3.15) (3.05) (5.20) (6.51) (6.86)
hydropot 0.0001 0.00005 0.00005 0.0001 0.00005 0.00005
(1.32) (0.53) (0.54) (1.33) (0.57) (0.57)
windpot 0.049 0.039 0.038 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.18) (0.14) (0.14) (1.18) (1.11) (1.15)
Observations 2157 1900 1913 2157 1900 1913 2450 2179 2192
Countries 101 93 93 101 93 93 119 107 107
R2 within 0.05 0.04 0.042 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.05
R2 between 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.14 0.14
R2 overall 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11
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Panel B
dbacba 0.084c 0.068c 0.015c
(3.37) (2.75) (5.43)
pcrdbgdp 0.086b 0.082b 0.003
(2.43) (2.38) (0.80)
llgdp 0.048 0.058 −0.01b
(1.32) (1.62) (2.45)
psreform −0.087b −0.087a −0.087a −0.087b −0.089a −0.089a 0.001 0.002 0.002a
(2.01) (1.84) (1.85) (2.03) (−1.88) (−1.88) (1.10) (1.55) (1.66)
kyoto 0.02a 0.026b 0.027b 0.019a 0.024b 0.026b 0.001 0.002 0.002
(1.84) (2.18) (2.33) (1.78) (2.08) (2.23) (0.98) (1.33) (1.34)
fincrisis 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001c 0.001c 0.001c
(0.62) (1.14) (0.93) (0.38) (0.78) (0.53) (2.71) (3.40) (3.79)
transition 0.003 0.005a 0.005a 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.001b 0.001c 0.001c
(1.16) (1.65) (1.88) (0.94) (1.26) (1.55) (2.42) (3.63) (3.15)
Observations 2439 2169 2182 2439 2169 2182 2439 2169 2182
Countries 118 106 106 118 106 106 118 106 106
R2 within 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.07
R2 between 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.16
R2 overall 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.12
Notes: All regressions are random-effects panel regressions using sample panel of non-OECD countries with one-year-lags for all
indicators, with the exception of psreform, kyoto, fincrisis and transition. Constant term, psreform, kyoto, gdppc, fdigdp and regional
dummies not shown for space reasons. Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. Constant term included in all specifications (not shown). a,
b, c statistically significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively.
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Table C. Outlier analysis and world comparison
(1) repc (2) repc (3) repc (4) hydropc (5) hydropc (6) hydropc (7) geopc (8) geopc (9) geopc
Panel A: world
dbacba 0.047 0.069 −0.035
(0.50) (1.00) (1.05)
pcrdbgdp 0.819c 0.417c 0.368c
(8.98) (6.16) (11.7)
llgdp −0.087 0.015 −0.141c
(0.76) (0.18) (3.78)
psreform 0.100 0.114 0.130 0.119 0.134 0.142 −0.011 −0.015 −0.006
(0.75) (0.78) (0.91) (0.92) (0.96) (1.03) (1.16) (1.44) (0.53)
kyoto 0.014 0.015 0.035 0.018 0.02 0.029 0.009 0.007 0.018a
(0.55) (0.54) (1.18) (0.93) (0.92) (1.36) (0.94) (0.71) (1.70)
Observations 3014 2752 2757 3014 2752 2757 3014 2752 2757
Countries 142 130 130 142 130 130 142 130 130
R2 within 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.13 0.18 0.13
R2 between 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.17
R2 overall 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.17
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Panel B: no hi-income
dbacba 0.063b 0.05a 0.012c
(2.33) (1.88) (3.80)
pcrdbgdp 0.084b 0.084b 0.001
(1.99) (2.02) (0.12)
llgdp −0.002 0.017 −0.016c
(0.04) (0.40) (3.35)
psreform −0.092a −0.095a −0.095a −0.094a −0.097a −0.097a 0.001 0.002a 0.002a
(1.83) (1.67) (1.66) (1.85) (1.70) (1.69) (1.37) (1.80) (1.80)
kyoto 0.006 0.015 0.016a 0.005 0.013 0.013 0.002a 0.003c 0.003c
(0.76) (1.56) (1.66) (0.67) (1.36) (1.42) (1.77) (2.59) (2.94)
Observations 2179 1879 1892 2179 1879 1892 2179 1879 1892
Countries 103 91 91 103 91 91 103 91 91
R2 within 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.09 0.10
R2 between 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.22 0.26 0.25
R2 overall 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.20 0.19
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Table C. Outlier analysis and world comparison
(1) repc (2) repc (3) repc (4) hydropc (5) hydropc (6) hydropc (7) geopc (8) geopc (9) geopc
Panel C: no outliers
dbacba 0.095c 0.077c 0.007c
(5.40) (4.57) (4.43)
pcrdbgdp 0.049b 0.046b 0.002
(2.02) (2.01) (0.90)
llgdp 0.048a 0.057b 0.001
(1.96) (2.41) (0.62)
psreform −0.025 −0.020 −0.020 −0.025 −0.021 −0.021 0.001 0.001 0.001
(1.10) (0.86) (0.87) (1.12) (0.91) (0.93) (0.93) (1.30) (1.27)
kyoto 0.014c 0.025c 0.024c 0.011b 0.019c 0.018c 0.002c 0.003c 0.003c
(2.76) (4.64) (4.49) (2.17) (3.76) (3.55) (4.75) (6.19) (6.03)
Observations 2433 2162 2175 2433 2162 2175 2424 2153 2166
Countries 118 106 106 118 106 106 118 106 106
R2 within 0.06 0.04 0.040 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.07
R2 between 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.10 0.14 0.14
R2 overall 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.12
Notes: All regressions are random-effects panel regressions; fdigdp, gdppc, regional dummy variables and constant term included but
not shown. One-year-lags for all indicators with the exception of psreform and regional dummies. Panel A shows world sample; Panel B
shows sample of non-OECD without high-income countries; Panel C shows sample of non-OECD countries without outliers Paraguay
(columns 1–6) and Costa Rica (columns 7–9). Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. a, b, c statistically significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent
levels, respectively.
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